Accessing the glocality of climate change: A cognitive fallacy by Ntamack, S
African Crop Science Journal, Vol. 20, Issue Supplement  s2, pp. 465 - 472   ISSN 1021-9730/2012 $4.00
Printed  in Uganda.  All rights reserved    ©2012,  African Crop Science Society
ACCESSING  THE  GLOCALITY  OF  CLIMATE  CHANGE:   A  COGNITIVE  FALLACY
SERGE  NTAMACK
University of Cape Town, South Africa
Corresponding author:  mackserge@hotmail.com
ABSTRACT
This essay addresses some methodological biases present in the mode of knowing the changing weather through
scientific research. These biases are coined with the concept of glocality. The paper argues that as a device of the
cognitive globalisation around environmental issues, glocality operates in science as a cognitive form of ubiquity
deriving from an attempt to compress the spatiotemporal dimension of the changing weather within the time and
space of the mind. In the case of climate change, it refers to three focal points summarised as problems of climate
change’s phenomena, problem of the ontologies of climate change’s phenomena and problem of the logics of
climate change’s phenomena. The intersections between these three problems show how blurry are the frontiers
between scientific knowledge and political power.
Key Words:   Climate change. cognition, globalisation,  international relations, knowledge
RÉSUMÉ
Cet essai traite de certains cas de méthodologie biaisée dans le mode de savoir sur le changement climatique à
travers la recherche scientifique. Ces erreurs sont associées au concept de la glocalité. Cet article montre que
comme instrument de la globalisation cognitive des problèmes environnementaux, la glocalité opère en science
comme une forme cognitive de l’ubiquité dérivant d’une tentative de comprimer la dimension spatiotemporelle du
changement climatique dans le temps et l’espace. Dans le cas du changement climatique, la glocalité se réfère à
trois points focaux exprimant les problèmes liés au phénomène du changement climatique, les problèmes du
phénomène ontologique du changement climatique et les systèmes logiques des phénomènes du changement
climatique. Les intersections entre ces trois problèmes montrent comment les frontières entre la connaissance
scientifique et le pouvoir politique ne sont pas claires.
Mots Clés:   Changement climatique, cognition, globalisation, relations internationales, connaisance
INTRODUCTION
Climate change transcends boundaries and
categories and erects itself as a cosmopolitan
phenomenon (Hulme, 2010). Hargens (n.d.) notes
that climate change is a multiple object, a hybrid
object – a combination of scientific third-person
observation and cultural second-person
meanings – and  an integral object i.e. “an
ontologically distinct phenomenon that is a
combination of first and second, and third person
dimensions”. In this regard he argues that distinct
and overlapping intrinsic features of climate
change are enacted by various individuals with
their own “kosmic address” which highlights that
an observer uses a method of observation to
observe something. Jamison (2010) reports that
there are three main positions in relation to climate
change knowledge depicted as dominant,
oppositional and emergent. The dominant
position is assumed by those who have been
more active in the last decade promoting the
reduction of emission of carbon dioxide and the
transition to a “low-carbon society”. The
oppositional is associated with those who have
been termed climate sceptics and question the
SERGE  NTAMACK466
importance of dealing with climate as opposed to
others issues. The emergent position is
associated with those who acknowledge the
happening of climate change and its serious
consequences. However this group stresses at
the same time the significance of dealing with
climate change in a manner that issues of justice
and fairness are seriously considered. Moreover
Jamison suggests that the rise of the dominant
voices in climate change knowledge has been
facilitated by their connection with the neo-liberal
and transnational capitalist movement. According
to him many of the dominant voices in the field of
climate change politics have been promoting the
establishment of closer relationship between
academic scientists, business firms, and in
commercialising scientific knowledge. As a result
the conception of science deriving from the vocal
voices on climate change is non-disciplinary and
entrepreneurial and makes the knowledge
produced in climate research centres dependent
on contexts both financial and organisational.
The country-specific’s experiences of the
weather are not limited to the tree positions
depicted by Jamison (2010). In fact the “cognitive
globalisation” of climate change through science
homogenizes the differential experiences of the
changing weather across the globe by
constructing a common consciousness around
environmental issues. The climate changes
locally and their causes -if there is any attached
to human activities -remain local while able to
affect distinctively multiple localities. Yet what is
considered or intend to be considered as
solutions for climate change are more informed
by local priorities rather than global or more
precisely universal concerns.  This paper argues
that situation is enabled through the device of
glocality. I define the glocality of climate change
as a cognitive form of ubiquity deriving from an
attempt to compress the spatiotemporal
dimension of the changing weather within the time
and space of the scientific mind. This form of
ubiquity erects an apparent unity through a focus
on a common object (climate change) and
overshadows the significance of its differential
manifestations by insisting rhetorically on some
of its material aspects (for instance rising sea,
desert encroachment, floods etc…); and by
trivialising the fact that although depicting some
common patterns, climate change remains before
all a local problem with distinctive features.
Concretely the illusion created by that projection
of the mind is sustained partly in the real world
by the objects (i.e. climate change or ozone layer)
of the “provisions linking developed-world
distributive transfer with developing-world
substantive environmental commitments while
recognising Southern development imperatives”
(Drumbl, 2002). This paper is a reflection on the
methodological biases embedded in some
scientific reasonings on the climate  seen through
the optic of glocality.  In this regard the glocality
of climate change entails three focal points that
are addressed in the three respective sections of
this essay concerned firstly the problems of
climate change’s phenomena, secondly the
problem of the ontologies of climate change’s
phenomena and finally the problem of the logics
of climate change’s phenomena.
The problems of climate change phenomena.
The enunciation of the prime terms “climate
change” recalls an imagery broader than the
semiotic scope of the word “weather”.  According
to the Oxford dictionary the weather is defined
as “the condition of the atmosphere at a certain
place and time, with reference to the presence or
absence of sunshine, rain, wind etc. “In contrast
climate refers to “the regular weather conditions
of an area or an area with certain weather
condition”. Climate suggests a set of regular
features of the atmosphere in a specific area while
the weather is characterised by the contingency
of the features of the atmosphere in a particular
place. Therefore “climate change3” is not the
equivalent of “weather change”- in fact the
weather always changes and it is exempt from
any regularity in its manifestations.  The idea of
regularity of the climate originated from a
synchronic snapshot of the repeating sequences
of a diachronically changing weather captured
by the scientific mind. But the climate does not
change in the same way from one area to another
and it is only from the locality that we can grasp
accurately the significance of the changing
weather primarily through the human body. As
such the gap between climate change and the
changing weather is not only the fact of the literal
distinction between “climate” and “weather” but
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also of an extent to which different modes of
knowing can acknowledge the same
phenomenon and provide explanations.
Climate change articulates its grammar across
the logics of the fields which speak of itself. It
evokes many things which find a principal
connection in its literal meaning. Defining it would
be authoritatively and instrumentally choosing
among its meanings, the one suitable for the
purpose of the present analysis. To avoid this
temptation, I prefer to acknowledge instead the
particular genealogy of climate change in regard
to its corollaries global warming and greenhouse
effect4.  As a result climate change can be dated
back to the work of the French scientist Jean
Baptiste Joseph Fourier in the early part of the
nineteenth century and later of John Tyndall, a
scientist working at the Royal Institute in London.
The works of those scientists have established a
causal relation between human industry and
climate change through the greenhouse effect
(Giddens, 2009). In other words the greenhouse
effect explicit the “scientific” foundations of the
anthropogenic cause of climate change. From
having been more or less ignored by policymakers
between 1970s and 1980s regardless of the
worrying evidence provided by the research
community, climate change became considered
as a serious matter thanks to the sophistication
of climate modelling by the 1990s (Brown et al.,
2007). However it is important to notice that while
this “scientific” explanation seems new, the impact
of human beings on the climate has been
acknowledged but explained differently
elsewhere (non-western settings) . In Cameroon
for instance in relation to “natural” disasters and
witchcraft, Geshiere (1995) notes that:
By definition, witchcraft is practiced in secret;
it is therefore often very difficult to know who
did what. Yet it is also a basic tenor to these
discourses that they explain each and any event
by referring to human agency. Thus, they tend to
personalise the universe: all sorts of events,
especially those that Westerners call “natural”
disasters or chance, are seen as direct
consequences of human acts- either individual
initiatives or, more often, collective conspiracies
fomented by shadow gangs.
It seems to me that the significance of the
human induced-climate change is less about the
validity of the explanations provided to
understand the human impact on the weather but
about its cogency in relation to its practical
implications in everyday life. In comparative
studies inquiring into the public opinion on global
warming in 48 countries (including among others,
South Africa, Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Burkina
Faso, Ethiopia, Mali , Rwanda and Zambia),
Kvaloy and Listhaug (2010) find that climate
change  is a political issue of potential importance
across the globe. However they note that the
perception of the problem is positively correlated
with high education, post-materialism, and left-
right self-identification (with strong concerns on
the far left). Besides Giddens (2009) recapitulates
three main positions linking the various views of
the earth and the impact of human on it. First,
according to him the sceptics are those who think
that that the earth is robust and the human impact
upon it is deemed to be negligible. Second those
closer to the mainstream, for whom the earth-at
least the ecosystems- is fragile and has to be
protected from the damaging intrusion we are
making into it. Finally they are those who see the
earth like “wild beast, ready and able to react
violently and precipitously once it is sufficiently
roused” (Giddens, 2009).  In this regard climate
change differs from a mere explanation about the
way human beings impact on the earth not by
being immune of the negatives consequences of
the fantasy of “non-scientific” explanation but
by being tied to the strategies of mitigation (i.e.
how to get society to implement alternative
approaches to economic growth that are less
carbon intensive) and adaptation (i.e., solutions
to help society to cope with the impacts of climate
change). Consequently the various degrees of
cogency which enjoy any explanation about the
human impact on the weather reflect the features
of the site (s) of cultural production of the area
where their implications can be traced. Moreover
, in order to find a solution to the indifference
originating from the relativity of the cogency of
the various explanations of the human impact on
the weather (in this case the scientific one),
Anthony Giddens suggests that the politics
climate change has to cope with what he calls
“Giddens’s paradox” meaning:
Since the dangers posed by global warming
aren’t tangible, immediate or visible in the course
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of day-to-day life, however awesome they appear,
many will sit on their hands and do nothing of
concrete nature about them. Yet waiting until they
become visible and acute before being stirred to
serious action will, by definition be too late.
Giddens’s paradox is a paradox of a particular
locality (an imagined geography of the West)
inhabited by a particular group of creatures,
having escaped temporally the incertitude of the
nature through technology and lost the
functionality of their bodies (embodied
knowledge). Those creatures can understand the
language of climate change but cannot experience
the change in the climate yet; therefore they
postpone the possibility to act accordingly until
their body sensory systems (sight) witness that
very change underground. In Giddens’s paradox
the intelligibility of the body is overshadowed
by the predictive power of the mind. As such it is
the outcome of a particular history of rationality.
In this respect Semali and Kincheloe (1999) note:
Rationality emerged as the conceptual base
around which civilisation and savagery could be
delineated (Giroux, 1992; Alcoff, 1995; Keating,
1995). This rationalistic modernist whiteness is
shaped and confirmed by its close association
with science. As a scientific construct, whiteness
privileges mind over body, intellectual over
experiential ways of knowing, mental abstraction
over passion, bodily sensations, and tactile
understanding.
The creatures described in Giddens’ paradox
are not human beings. In case they were and even
if I admit the possibility that technology acts as a
wall distorting the communication between them
and the earth via their body sensory systems;
there is still no significant evidence why they do
not take the risks of global warming seriously-
especially if the assumption behind Giddens’s
paradox is that they (the majority of them at least)
do understand the language of science
(rationality) and trust its outcome. As such
Giddens falls in the trap of intellectualism which
treats perception as a matter of judgement (See
Cerbone, 2006). It follows then that the scientific
argument driving climate change just like the
“non-scientific” explanations of the human
impact on the earth enjoy a relative degree of
cogency. The predictive power of science
obviously enjoys more regularity than
witchcraft’s predictions, but science is neither
immune of risks and limitations. Schimank (1992)
distinguishes two kinds of conditions leading to
the production of societal risks of science-based
technologies namely the general systemic
dynamic of scientific risk production and the
specific institutional conditions. Along the lines
of the first conditions Shimank (1992) adds that:
Scientific truths are, at least in the natural and
engineering sciences, almost always produced
under a laboratory conditions which constitutes
extreme simplifications of the conditions under
which these truths are implemented in
technologies (Bohme and van den Daele, 1977).
This simplification is necessary to detect isolated
causal relationships which would otherwise be
hidden within the dense texture of “real-life”
causalities. The “tight coupling” of the world has
to be substituted by the “loose coupling” of the
experiment. Thus scientific truths are strictly
speaking, very artificial propositions which can
only cover the reality outside the laboratory
inaccurately.
In this respect “knowledge, or more
accurately, knowledges (in the plural, to indicate
the disappearance of a unified mental world) are
both a personal and social force and resources
containing unprecedented social and political
consequences (McCarthy, 1996)”.
In the fourth report (2007) of the International
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), IPCC says that
“warming of the climate system is equivocal”
while the rest of the report is couched in terms in
probabilities (Giddens, 2009). Those probabilities
go hand in hand with the inaccuracy of the
scientific answers on climate change (Revilla et
al., 2010). Sandvik has noted that the research
agenda on climate change is a twofold project;
on one side it plans to provide the scientific
foundation of climate change, and on the other
side it presupposes the integration of purely
scientific argument with factors that influence
attitude formation and decision making (Kvaloy
and Listhaug, 2010). The strength of the argument
driving climate change has as main pillar not its
shaky scientific character but the authority of
the IPCC which recognised its validity by moving
from a focus on decreasing uncertainties in
climate models to informing decisions that are
increasingly based on what we know as basic
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science (Revilla et al., 2010) - this is not to say
that there is not an inner scientific foundation of
climate change but that that scientific foundation
is still fragile.
The scientification of the global character of
climate change through political recognition,
blurs the lines between the outcomes of climate
change per se and the inherent dynamic of the
weather. The causes of climate change are local,
the effects are global but the scientific
measurements (or experiential ways of knowing)
of those effects remain mostly local. Africa
epitomise well this situation. It is portrayed as
the region which will suffer the most from climate
change, despite the fact that African countries
are both absolutely and per capita terms an
insignificant source of emissions of CO2 globally
while the developed countries remain the major
emitters (Carius, 2009).  That depiction of Africa
as the victim or as merely incapable to deal with
the effects of climate change is not scientifically
valid. Few scientific researches delineating the
effects of climate change from the inherent
dynamic of weather has been conducted on the
continent and few are likely to be conducted
because of the financial constraints of African
countries and the high cost of climate change
modelling (Giorgi et al., 2010:2). However
portraying Africa as a “victim” (or more accurately
“incapable”) can originate from a teleological
reading of both climate change’s potential
physical impact and Africa’s current
technological (in) capacity to adapt to the effects
of global warming. Therefore it is likely that this
type of understanding of Africa does not escape
the western foundations of the discourses about
Africa studied by Mudimbe and paraphrases by
Mbembe (2002) in the following words:
From this point of view, Africa as such exists
only on the basis of the text that constructs it as
the Other’s fiction. This text is then accorded a
structuring power, to the point that a self that
claims to speak with its own authentic voice
always run the risk of being condemned to
expressed itself in a pre-established discourse
that mask its own, censures it , or forces it to
imitate.
 The problem of the ontologies of climate change
phenomena.  In the global governance the problem
of ontologies of climate change’s phenomena is
illustrated by the permeability of two types of
ontologies (universality I and universality II)
through the device of power or authority. Robert
Cox (2001) distinguishes two types of ontologies,
“universality I” and “Universality II”.
“Universality I” is an affirmation of the ultimate
reality of the universe. It has its roots in
monotheist religion and was taken over in secular
form of enlightenment. In this ontology human
being invent the idea of God as the all-powerful
creator; from that they reverse the process of
invention to assume the human mind to be the
Godlike, which is to have the potential for
understanding the truth of the universe.
“Universality I” according to Cox is represented
by the affirmation of the kind of truth embodied
in religious revelations or certainties of
enlightenment philosophy. It can also in a
spurious form be applied to affirmations of the
universality that are manifestly products of a
particular historical situation but not recognised
to be such for lack of critical self-appraisal. For
example: neoliberalism. “Universality II” is the
attempt to identify the basic constitutive factors
that help toward understanding and acting upon
a particular historical conjuncture. We could say
the task is one perceiving the historical structures
that characterise an epoch. These structures,
which are mental constructions, summarise the
cumulative result of human actions over time. The
purpose of defining them is to construct a base
point for considering the problems of
maintenance or transformation of a particular
order. Universality II is universal in transitory
way, the snapshot of a world in a perpetual motion,
the synchronic picture of something which is
diachronically changing. I think that the
recognition of global warming by IPCC legitimates
the use of “universality I” on behalf of
“universality II” as a way to tackle the threat
represented by climate change for the current
world order.  While they are certain elements of
responsibility in IPCC’s decision we cannot
ignore its instrumental character. In this light IPCC
has acted as an intelligent actor. For Dryzek and
Berejikian (2000) in case actions constitute
situations, then intelligent actors should reason
constitutively as well as instrumentally, such that
constitutive concerns should often overrides
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instrumental ones. For these scholars
“instrumental rationality is the capacity to devise,
select and affect good means to clarified and
consistent ends.” Conversely in constitutive
reasoning, an actor does not ask the instrumental
question, “Does action X help achieve goal Y? “
Instead, the actor asks, “Does action X help to
constitute a world I find attractive?
In contrast Falk (1999) remind us that neither
the nation-state nor the United Nations has the
capacity to tackle the environmental problems in
the current world, such a role should be played
by the global civil society in what he calls “the
globalisation from-below5”.  But “global civil
society” as a concept and social movement is
problematic as Bob (2005) notes:
The term ‘global civil society’ is often used
to counterpose a realm of principle and morality
against one marked by self-seeking, profit, and
power. Yet this view, reflecting one aspect of
transnational relations, obscures as much as it
illuminates. For academics, it furnishes few
analytic tools for explaining why some
challengers excite major support while others,
equally if not more worthy, remains orphans. More
broadly it misrepresents the underlying realities.
The organisations and individuals composing
networks are certainly motivated, in part, by high
principles. But questions of organisational
maintenance and survival also permeate NGO
decision making.
Thus in order to grasp the “underlying
realities” of climate change it is important to stay
critical about the “cognitive globalisation”
enhanced by global civil society in matter
concerning a common consciousness around
environmental issues. Interesting enough in
Falk’s insight, it is his suggestion of a cooperative
relationship between the market and the global
civil society. In this regard the global civil society
it is not that different from United Nation or the
nation-state in his ability to use both instrumental
and constitutive rationality while leaving the
current world order unchanged. Furthermore its
role suggests that we delineate what is global
from what is universal and face the fact that the
priority of locality (multiple localities if global)
remains the shaping force of political action and
activism. But under the cover of global civil
society or a cause affiliated to it, Northern
countries can justify undue interventions in
Southern ones. As such a term like “global civil
society” eludes the historical relationships of
domination still pervading North-South relations
nowadays and homogenises some of the
competing logics at work underground, this for
the sake of mainstream politics (See, Slater, 2004).
In contrast for Drumbl (2002: 854) in what he calls
the “compact swap.
“North-South relationships are witnessing
some changes in relation to environmental issues.
For Drumbl “compact swap” means a “deal or
arrangement to come together strategically to
attain a particular goal”. In other words “ it is one
thing to say that  A should ( even, shall) provide
X to B, it is quite another thing to say that, should
A not effectively provide X to B, then B’s promises
to A may no longer be binding”
The problem of the logics of climate change
phenomena.  Considering that world politics is
populated by more or less intelligent actors, the
problem of reflexivity of the logics addressing
climate change’s phenomena is recurrent.
Concerning the global governance of climate
change Dryzek (2009) identify seven relevant
discourses available in the public space namely
ecological limits, promethean discourse, energy
security, radical transformation, denial that climate
change exists, ecological modernisation and
climate justice. But it is important to bear in mind
that those discourses neither enjoy the same
discursive significance (the number of time a
discourse is repeated) nor are they fairly
represented as Dryzek puts it:
In the global governance of climate change,
of course elections do not exist, and national
elections make very little contribution to
transnational accountability. More generally,
states governments are rarely called to account
for their act of commission and omission in
relation to global concerns; they always have a
national interest in defense that can cover up
any failures to respond to concerns emanating
from public space. Failing that, they can always
blame other states or international processes for
their own deficiencies. In short accountability
within the global deliberative system is currently
weak.
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Giddens (2009) warns us against the
bandwagon effect which according to him is the
use of the global warming as a way to legitimate
other concerns .That proposition is highly limited
regarding the fact that climate change affects
people and regions in different ways, the diversity
of the discourses on it is illustrative. Furthermore
by grounding his analyses on climate change in
the realist’s theory of international relations and
by virtue of being a pro-European (supporter of
EU), Giddens has almost no leverage to escape
the bandwagon effect (Giddens, 2010). In fact the
limitations of the realism and his position (Europe
and white body) constitute an enclave in which
he thinks and experience the world to produce
the narratives of Energy security ( one of the
relevant discourse on climate change available
in the public space). Moreover Falk (1999) notes
that: “realism” continues to hold sway in foreign
offices and within the academic establishment,
especially among those experts who interconnect
who interconnect with those who shape global
policy. Realism is conflict-oriented and state-
centered, dismissing law and morality”. In this
regard the contribution of Anthony Giddens titled
The Politics of Climate Change is one of the
dominant logic among the competing logics
addressing the climate change problem and its
insufficiency of reflexivity makes it a part of the
problem of the logics of climate change’s
phenomena.   In contrast Falk (1999) proposed a
logic encompassing well-being of people and
success of markets. But a question remains about
Falk’s suggestion, who or how many are the
people selected for  that well-being, knowing that
a market-driven economy has been seen as a
major cause of inequalities and conflicts in the
global south (See, Allouche, 2011).  Bearing
Giddens and Falk antagonist views in mind,
McCarthy (1996) opines the political component
of the social construction of meaning become
visible when culture no longer refers to shared
meanings that reflect a people’s way of life.
Instead according to him cultural practices refers
to the huge number of institutions, classes, ands
groups that compete in the articulation of social
meaning of things, to the many sites and positions
from which ideas and knowledges are developed,
and to the conflicts arising out the struggle to
stage performances and to affect audiences.
CONCLUSION
The impact of the changing weather on earth can
be experienced in various ways. This paper
attempted to address the methodological biases
content in the homogenisation of differential
experiences of the weather through scientific
reasonings. The paper has called these
overlapping biases, glocality. In this paper the
glocality of climate change has been addressed
into three main sections namely, the problems of
climate change’s phenomena, the problem of the
ontologies of climate change’s phenomena and
finally the problem of the logics of climate
change’s phenomena. Each sections of this essay
has tried to highlight some facets of climate
change’s reality. However in applied metaphysics,
reality is assumed to be a matter of degree, that
phenomena that are indisputably real in the
colloquial sense that they exist may become more
or less real depending to the extent of their
integration into scientific thought and practices
(Daston, 2000). Therefore in this manner the
supremacy of scientific mode of knowing the
weather is rendered possible by disallowing
competing sources of judgement (Rabeneck,
2008). Such a supremacy of science over different
alternatives of knowing is not scientific at all.
However   it illustrates the inherent relationship
between scientific knowledge and political power,
a relationship we cannot override but only
understand and monitor.
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